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believe that the Law of Historical Memory 
will have achieved some type of settle-
ment about the past in the long term. 
Nevertheless, he recognizes that given 
the current climate of economic crisis 
after the global financial crisis of 2008, 
the issue of historical memory has lost its 
urgency in Spain. While no longer front 
page news, Encarnación asserts that the 
Law of Historical Memory deserves credit 
for creating a less contentious climate, its 
symbolic importance in addressing the is-
sue of historical memory, and for opening 
a public debate about the merits of such 
a law. Encarnación’s book itself offers an 
engaging entry in this public debate that 
posits lessons about Spain’s experience 
with “democratization without justice” 
that transcend the Spanish experience 
and offer thoughts on political transitions 
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There are historians who do dense narra-
tive history with great attention to docu-
menting the details. And there are other 
historians who use history to paint a big 
conceptual picture whose accuracy often 
leads to much debate. Joe Renouard is in 
the former camp, with his new book on 
human rights in US foreign policy during 
the middle and late stages of the Cold 
War. Samuel Moyn is in the latter camp, 
with his stimulating and widely read but 
controversial interpretations in The Last 
Utopia: Human Rights in History. 
They both agree, as do others, that 
attention to human rights in US foreign 
policy increased more or less around 
1970. However, they differ as to why. 
The subject is important and merits 
extended attention. For Moyn, “The best 
general explanation for the origins of 
this [human rights] social movement and 
common discourse around rights remains 
the collapse of other, prior utopias, both 
state-based and internationalist.”1 That is, 
the push for international human rights is 
not just idealism but actually a utopian 
project, and attention to these rights took 
off only after the evident failures of two 
other utopian movements—communism, 
and national liberation from colonialism.
There is broad agreement that after 
the adoption of the UN Charter with its 
path breaking reference to human rights 
and adoption of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights by the UN General 
Assembly in 1948, not much of immedi-
  1. samuel moyn, tHe last utoPIa: Human rIGHts In HIstory 8 (2010)
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ate importance happened on the world 
stage with regard to rights for some time 
(except in Europe). This suggests that 
political elites really did not engage in 
much negative learning from the German 
holocaust by making sure not to repeat 
genocide and other gross violations of 
human rights. They continued to priori-
tize traditional national interests such as 
power and independence even if overlaid 
with an ideological superstructure—e.g., 
anti-communism, anti-colonialism, or 
anti-capitalism. In fact, President Harry 
Truman did not consider the 1948 Dec-
laration important enough to mention 
in his memoirs. Moyn goes too far in 
arguing that the push for human rights 
circa 1970 was a totally new develop-
ment, without connection to antecedent 
talk about rights. However, for reasons 
of space, that point will not be pursued 
in depth here.
For Renouard, who cites Moyn2 but 
does not directly engage with his argu-
ments, US attention to human rights is 
part of the idealistic tradition and took off 
in the late 1960s because of a long list of 
international and domestic factors.3 The 
evident failure of communism and anti-
colonialism to deliver on their promises 
is not among the factors he noted. There 
is good reason for this, Renouard is on 
the correct track, and this will be covered 
later in this review.
Communism in the West was widely 
considered a façade for self-serving auto-
cratic rule long before circa 1970. Joseph 
Stalin had appealed to Russian national-
ism rather than international communism 
during the dark days of World War II, 
shutting down the Comintern. In addi-
tion, the split between Stalin and Josip 
Tito, so clear by 1948, reaffirmed the 
continuing strength of some version of 
nationalism even by those identifying as 
communists. There are clear reasons why 
former communists wrote a book with the 
title The God That Failed in 1949.4 The 
Soviet crushing of the Hungarian uprising 
in 1956 only confirmed again what was 
widely known: Russian-led communism 
was less a utopian crusade based on inter-
national solidarity in pursuit of liberating 
people from exploitation, and more a fig 
leaf for an autocratic Russian Empire. A 
defensive fear of “encirclement” by hos-
tile Western forces may have driven the 
Empire—the same fear perhaps found in 
Putin’s mindset today. However, the result 
of Soviet power remained an empire. It 
is strange that a respected historian like 
Moyn, now at Harvard, would ignore so 
much historical evidence about the early 
recognition of the failure of communism 
in the West to deliver on its promises. For 
whatever reason, he constructed a pro-
vocative but erroneous big picture. Again, 
before the 1970s, the concept of “the 
God that Failed” was well known and had 
virtually nothing to do with the renais-
sance of the human rights discourse—as 
further explained below. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 had something 
to do with expanded global action for 
human rights, but not circa 1970.
With regard to communism outside 
Europe, again Moyn is wrong but for a 
different reason. The lure of communism 
remained vibrant for some in Asia and 
elsewhere after the 1970s, specifically 
in China and parts of India. Also in Latin 
America, communist movements in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua endured into the 
1980s. The appeal of communism was, in 
  2. Id. at 8.
  3. Joe renouard, Human rIGHts In amerICan foreIGn PolICy: from tHe 1960s to tHe sovIet CollaPse 
6–12 (2016).
  4. tHe God tHat faIled (Richard Crossman ed., 1972)
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fact, not over by the 1970s, undermining 
Moyn’s argument. It strains credulity to 
think that a leftist such as Daniel Ortega 
would think: communism has failed so 
now I am free to emphasize human rights. 
Some non-communists in the West may 
have thought this after 1991, but not 
circa 1970. The Reagan Administration 
(1981–1989) remained mostly fixated on 
“the communist menace” especially in 
Central America. In China, the ruling elite 
led by Deng Xiaoping indeed turned to-
ward more capitalist practices in the late 
1970s. This shift was based on some pri-
vate property rights as protected by legal 
contracts, but the one party state contin-
ued to pursue short term stability through 
repression and an increasingly evident 
rejection of civil and political rights. In 
addition, Western trading partners have 
downplayed human rights violations in 
China because of shared economic and 
strategic interests. The Carter Administra-
tion (1977–1981) generally gave China a 
pass regarding human rights violations. 
The status of communism circa 1970 
had little to do with renewed attention 
to international human rights, whether in 
Europe or beyond.
As for the anti-colonial movement, 
after 1945 it was certainly a priority for 
many who felt their dignity denied under 
colonialism, but it did not speak to the 
same set of issues as raised by the main-
stream human rights discourse. These 
latter issues were centered on personal 
rights within states, rather than remain-
ing quiescent until colonialism had been 
undermined, and were in fact part and 
parcel of many if not most anti-colonial 
movement long before the 1970s. This is 
clearly evident in public debates about 
personal rights in the anti-colonial move-
ment in India, and almost everywhere in 
the emerging post-colonial world, before 
and after 1947. Within the anti-colonial 
movement, there was almost always a 
debate about, and a power struggle over, 
autocracy versus personal rights of vari-
ous sorts as in Algeria and Kenya.5 Once 
again, Moyn is off base in his reconstruc-
tion of events. Demands for national 
independence from colonial rule did 
not supplant and suppress human rights 
debates. Rather, the two were intertwined 
early on, inherently so. Moreover, the 
anti-colonial movement did not fail in 
its “utopian” objectives. It succeeded: 
colonialism became illegitimate. What 
remained was the separate set of issues 
concerning personal rights in newly 
independent nation-states, as evaluated 
against the benchmark of international 
recognized human rights.6
My own view is similar to, but not 
identical with, Renouard’s in that US 
foreign policy began to give greater 
attention to internationally recognized 
human rights circa 1970, rather than just 
to “freedom” in the Cold War struggle, 
for myriad, disjointed, and contingent 
reasons. This is quite different from 
Moyn’s view. 
  5. See fabIan Klose, Human rIGHts In tHe sHadoW of ColonIal vIolenCe: tHe Wars of IndePendenCe 
In Kenya and alGerIa (Dona Geyer trans., 2013). 
  6. Moyn considers the push for international human rights utopian in large part precisely 
because these rights are international and not grounded in national law and courts. But 
the point of international human rights is to set a standard by which to judge national 
developments. The international norms are to be implemented primarily through national 
processes. Only if national authorities are “unable or unwilling” to meet international 
standards are international authorities supposed to control. International rights standards 
do not float in some metaphysical international universe but are linked to concrete 
national factors—and are negotiated primarily by national delegations in the first place.
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1) The United States as a whole was 
troubled by war crimes and atrocities 
so evident in the war in Southeast Asia. 
After 1968, Democrats seized on this 
mood to further challenge the realist 
and dissembling policies of President 
Richard Nixon and National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger.7 Democrats 
in Congress like Representative Donald 
Fraser of Minnesota found the language 
of human rights useful in their critiques of 
Republican realism and the downplaying 
of human rights and humanitarian law by 
Kissinger. This was true par excellence in 
the rise of Jimmy Carter. 
2) At about the same time and for 
different reasons, a bargain was struck 
at the UN after which the UN Human 
Rights Commission began to take up 
specific inquiries in a negotiated range 
of countries. These inquiries included 
torture by the pro-Western Greek junta; 
repression in a developing country like 
Haiti; occupation of Palestinian territories 
by Israel; racism in apartheid South Af-
rica; etc. Increasingly, the United States 
had to take a position on these issues 
within the context of the international law 
of human rights and humanitarian affairs. 
3) Cross cutting these factors was 
the emergence of private groups like 
Amnesty International. Starting in 1961, 
mainstream media picked up the group’s 
publications that stressed international 
standards on civil rights. 
4) Still further, the rise of moral cru-
saders in the Republican Party, like Barry 
Goldwater and Reagan, and the early 
neo-cons in the Democratic Party, like 
Senator Scoop Jackson, again used the 
language of human rights to attack the 
Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policies of detente 
with the Soviet Union. Rather than the 
pursuit of stability in Great Power rela-
tions, these early neo-cons in the Demo-
cratic Party sought a crusade in the name 
of victory or roll back. One result was the 
Helsinki Accords and its “basket three” of 
issues—and also the proliferation of other 
rights groups like Helsinki Watch which 
over time became Human Rights Watch.8 
5) Space does not permit further 
enumeration, but there were additional 
reasons for increased use of the human 
rights discourse in the United States 
around 1970, such as the cumulative 
effect of the Black civil rights movement 
increasingly linking domestic concerns 
to international developments and vice 
versa.9
Hence, there was a cascading and 
expanding discourse on internationally 
  7. Niall Ferguson’s characterization of Kissinger not as a realist but as an idealist is cre-
ative but misleading. Picturing Kissinger as committed to a life of principle in which 
he endorsed pessimistic standards, to be achieved by dissembling and deception, is an 
interesting form of idealism. To be skeptical about progressive developments, and hence 
willing to endorse evil as the lesser evil, is hardly a conventional notion of idealism. 
Right from the opening pages this book is an advocate’s brief, not a balanced biography, 
even if Ferguson articulates a few minor criticisms of his subject. nIall ferGuson, KIssInGer. 
volume 1, 1923–1968: tHe IdealIst (2015). 
  8. In general, Republicans tend to utilize the discourse on human rights in relation to 
“American values” whereas Democrats are slightly more inclined to mention human rights 
as found in international law. Republicans like Reagan both referred to human rights and 
also disparaged international law and the United Nations as foreign constructs. These 
two semantic traditions, human rights as part of American values and human rights as 
found in international law and organization, permit some agreement across the parties. 
One sees this in the history of the human rights bureau in the State Department under 
both Democratic and Republican administrations.
  9. See mary louIse dudzIaK, Cold War CIvIl rIGHts: tHe relatIonsHIP betWeen CIvIl rIGHts and 
foreIGn affaIrs In tHe truman admInIstratIon (2001).
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recognized human rights in the United 
States more or less around 1970, but not 
for any one or two similar reasons. Not 
much of this had anything to do with 
waiting for the failures of communism, 
and the limitations of the anti-colonial 
movement, to become evident. 
If Renouard has the better of the argu-
ment about the emergence of increased 
attention to the human rights discourse 
in Washington, one might wish that he 
had manifested some of Moyn’s pen-
chant for big picture conceptualizing. 
Renouard tends to overwhelm the reader 
with a mass of details. Perhaps this is 
necessary when covering disparate cases 
during the different decades. For Carter, 
there was his special interest in Latin 
America, relations with other dictators, 
and the special cases of the Shah of 
Iran and Afghanistan after the Soviet 
invasion. For Reagan, there was the role 
of anti-communist ideology, the special 
case of Central America, East Asian 
developments, and the big emphasis 
on democracy promotion at least here 
and there. But, one doubts in particular 
that students will be able to synthesize 
and summarize the impressive amount 
of narrative history presented about the 
record on human rights compiled by the 
Congress plus the Carter and Reagan ad-
ministrations,10 not to mention the push 
for democracy abroad toward the end 
of the Cold War.11 The author has read a 
great deal and seems largely accurate in 
his dense history. Given the amount of 
material covered however, it is important 
to be able to have thematic summaries. 
Yet his conceptual framework and the 
final big picture winds up being far short 
of new or profound.
To the extent that Renouard has a con-
ceptual framework for his study, it is the 
traditional view that attention to human 
rights abroad is liberal idealism which 
creates tension with a self-interested 
realism based on perceptions of national 
interest.12 This traditional framing is not 
new, nor does it allow one to explore 
the difference between so-called neo-
cons like George W. Bush and realists 
like George H. W. Bush. Kissinger, for 
what it is worth, regarded Reagan as a 
liberal, not a realist.13 Renouard notes 
the view, which he attributes to some 
activists, that at least on some occasions 
national self-interest can be blended with 
attention to the rights of others.14 But just 
as he did not really engage with Moyn’s 
incompatible interpretations, Renouard 
does not take on in any significant way 
William F. Schulz’s detailed argument 
that serious attention to human rights 
is often very much in the United States 
self-interest in the long run.15 Even if one 
agrees with Schulz’s argument, there still 
remains the question of how to get from 
here to there. Supporting Abdel al-Sisi’s 
repression in Egypt no doubt guarantees 
future problems and eventual explosions 
of discontent. But should policymakers 
in Washington push for the uncertain 
quest for stable democracy in the future, 
when in the short term there is pressure 
to link up with a reliable if repressive ally 
 10. renouard, supra note 3, ch. 2–4.
 11. Id. ch. 5.
 12. Id. at 6.
 13. Henry KIssInGer, dIPlomaCy 763, 771 (1994) (use of only the liberal-realist distinction 
makes it very difficult to accurately portray figures such as Ronald Reagan and George 
W. Bush).
 14. renouard, supra note 3, at 18.
 15. WIllIam f. sCHulz, In our oWn best Interest: HoW defendInG Human rIGHts benefIts us all 
(2001).
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in a troubled and violent region posing 
dangers to the United States homeland?
The best that the author can do by way 
of conclusion is to argue that Washing-
ton has had a mixed record in wrestling 
with the tensions between liberalism and 
realism in foreign policy. He argues that 
“consistency is an impossible standard,”16 
and notes “the selectivity of policies and 
rhetoric.”17 Reinhold Niebuhr concluded 
something similar decades ago, as far 
back as the 1930s, when he argued that 
attempts to advance morality or justice 
in the state system of world affairs always 
led to a mixed picture with unsatisfying 
compromises. Renouard’s ultimate con-
clusion is that the basic liberal-realist 
tension will continue. He writes that 
given nationalism and the commitment to 
national interest, “it remains to be seen” 
just what role attention to human rights 
will play in future US foreign policy.18 
This is definitely not a new and provoca-
tive argument, even if his coverage of 
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